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Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: A Critical Assessment of Zimbabwe’s Demobilization and Reintegration Programmes, 1980-2000 Gerald Mazarire* and Martin R. Rupiya** Introduction Around their plight of destitution and impoverishment
grew the present Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association
(ZNLWVA). While elements amongst the war veterans have taken up
a political position in support of the ruling party, as is their
constitutional right, unfortunately, some have publicly stated that
they will not support the emergence of any opposition political
party. Not surprisingly, these comments have created social and
political tensions as the country approaches what has turned out
to be an uncharacteristically bruising election to be held in June
this year. This development however, is not entirely unexpected.
A World Bank Report on Demobilization and Reintegration of Military
Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies2
released in 1992 had warned that: The mixed record of success with demobilization and social reintegration programmes (some aborted, others delayed, others carried out successfully in the initial stages) underlines the fact that their success or failure is inter-twined, to the political backdrop against which they take place . . . The more ambiguous the conflict and its termination, the more susceptible the demobilization and reintegration programme seems to be becoming embroiled in factional disputes.3 Definition . . . demobilization programmes are often organizationally complex and politically contentious by nature. A wide range of factors has to be considered if the ultimate success of these programmes is to be ensured including preparation for demobilization, organizing, planning . . . and ensuring the provision of effective education and training for former military personnel.4 Different strategies are employed. In the case of the economy,
restrictive blockades and sanctions for example, are lifted while
new lines of trade and exchange are established according to the
reigning political philosophy. Taking the experience of the Second
World War, when the world was split between East and West, as a
consequence of competing ideological philosophies that informed
economic conduct, there were no uniform practices in either camp
in the area of demobilization and civil reintegration. As regards
the society, policies of co-existence and reconciliation are normally
put forward. However, it is in the area of transforming the armed
forces that we find complexities requiring both direct and indirect
policies in order to make a favourable impact. As a result, while
there is much that can be said about the overarching framework to
this debate that is demilitarization, we will focus on the policy
and operational levels of demobilization. This paper will seek to confine itself only to the aspect of assessing
the state’s inability to carry out demobilization and civil
reintegration between 1980 to the present and suggest the way forward.
Because proper demobilization and civil reintegration has not been
carried out, this national problem will not go away and will need
to be confronted directly as part of a general demilitarization
of the Zimbabwean society that must come at some point in the future.
Furthermore, some elements of the war veterans have aligned themselves
with the ruling party. However, they have also vowed to take up
arms if ‘their party’ is defeated at the polls. This is
unfortunate and heralds political and social strife for the country.
This therefore makes it all the more important that we offer policy
alternatives for practitioners who will be faced with the task of
addressing the demobilization problem in the future. [ Top ] History of Demilitarization, Demobilization and Civil Reintegration
in Zimbabwe, 1980-87 The first formal and comprehensive demobilization and civil reintegration policy was launched on 5 October 1981 and was terminated with the closure of the Demobilization Directorate in 1983.5 Several distinguishing features of the exercise could be isolated once peace had been attained through the political process of elections which were held in February and March 1980. Within the demilitarization framework, emphasis was to be put on development based on shifting the allocation of resources from security to education and other social welfare sectors. Soon afterwards, a core force was agreed to — of about 33 000 men and women from between 80 to 100 000 available.6 A majority was former Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA)7 combatants with several thousand African troops from the former Rhodesian Security Forces. The ratios emerging would influence aspects of force design and the desired political orientation of the force. The latter aspects also took into account the colonial inheritance as well as military aid through the British Military Aid Training Team (BMATT) that was extended toward the remaining core force. In order to cater for those away from the armed forces, a Demobilization
Agency — the Demobilization Directorate, operating under the
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, was established. This was
mandated to supervise the human transition from war to peace. The
Agency was allocated an average of just over Z$50 million a year
for the three financial years 1981-82, 1982-83 and 1983-84.8
The resources allocated were also targeted to benefit the small-scale
enterprises as well as establish a skills training centre at Msasa
for members entering this category.9 However, as it later
turned out, the socialist philosophy that informed government policies
at this time did not favour private enterprise and this route did
not make a serious dent in providing a solution to the ‘demobilization
problem’. Efforts by the state were also augmented by support from donors,
including over 3 400 scholarships targeted at critical areas in
the economy from the Canadian government. These were to run through
the period from the mid-1980s until 1988.10 Meanwhile,
the economy as was later evident by 1988-89, was already experiencing
a slow-down in growth with no jobs being created. Given the impact of the resources at the individual level, set
at Z$185,00 per month over 24 months, the sums were generally far
short of what was required in order to adequately assist former
combatants to ease themselves back into the capitalist economy inherited
from Rhodesia. Many lacked the necessary skills while those in command
of the economy spurned the new entrants. Furthermore, serious government
corruption was later unearthed in the selection and allocation of
scholarships.11 As a result, these did not really benefit
the intended beneficiaries — the ex-combatants. The most important development to undermine the first policy of
demobilization in this country however, was the political fall out
that occurred in this country soon after independence with the coalition
government and secondly, the apartheid South Africa policy of destabilization.12
For a start, the political attempts to establish a coalition government
between the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert
Mugabe and the Zimbabwe Peoples Union (ZAPU) led by Josua Nkomo
collapsed in late 1982 and Joshua Nkomo was forced to go into exile
in March 1983. At the military level, units being integrated fell
under the vicious faction fighting of units made up former liberation
war fighters. This trend characterized problems surrounding attempts
to establish a core force.13 Many businesses and properties
that had been acquired by ZAPU and its armed wing, ZIPRA were confiscated.
Amongst these were farms, transport companies and other enterprises
that had been acquired by demobilized former ZIPRA combatants who
had invested their severance payments. In undertaking this line
of action, government, almost without realizing it, was undermining
one of its own policies, that of demobilizing combatants with a
severance package.14 Furthermore, the early political and military
conflict between elements of the Patriotic Front as well as the
external factor as presented by South Africa’s destabilization
efforts at this time had effectively forced government to abandon
demilitarization and demobilization. The overarching framework of demilitarization was abandoned as the threatened state and people undertook rapid militarization in order to deploy forces on two fronts barely two years into independence. This was on the external front in Mozambique along the Beira, Limpopo and Nyamapanda Corridors and inside the country. In the latter case, troop deployment was concentrated in and around Matabeleland.15 New, ‘politically correct units’ were established from 1981 and 1982. This gave birth to the Korean trained Presidential Guards, the Artillery Regiment and the 5th Brigade as well as the now defunct People’s Militia. Overally, the armed forces rose to nearly 52 000 and have stayed at this level since. [ Top ] From the above practice, for all intents and purposes, demobilization
and civil reintegration had been formally abandoned when the Demobilization
Directorate presented its final report after it was closed down
in June 1983. On hand were 19 163 former combatants who were now
expected to reintegrate into society aided by the severance payments
spread over two years as pointed out above. Many of the former ZIPRA combatants had taken up arms during this
“dissident era” and the government deployed soldiers against
them as well as against the general population in the western part
of the country. A full political, economic and military offensive
was under way against ZAPU and former ZIPRA cadres. By March 1983,
the leader of ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo, was forced into exile. Furthermore, those from ZANLA or in full employment were beginning to find it difficult to make ends meet. Consequently, many gathered around the debilitating plight of the “Class of ’83.” It is against this background that we seek to isolate some of the pitfalls that led to the failure of the first demobilization and civil reintegration initiative. The exercise had begun against a background of intrigue and mistrust both internally and externally as real or suspected plans by the Rhodesians supported by South Africa and ZAPU to challenge the new and perceptively weak state of Zimbabwe. This informed the politics of the country in the first few years and subsequent policies adopted had little to do with demilitarization and the orderly demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. As a result, no comprehensive policy of demobilization existed after the cursory passing of the one in 1981. In other words, this policy was not evaluated annually and fine-tuned to respond to developments that would negate its success. Much more importantly, there was no post exercise evaluation of
demobilization undertaken after 1983 by the state. Decisions based
on questions of security by government therefore dominated and in
this reducing military capacity was the last thing that was contemplated.
On the basis of the perceived insecurity, government needed all
hands on board and started ferocious recruiting and establishing
new units that included the mobilization of its party cadres as
militia. It was also against this background that inadequate resources16
and political attention was paid to demobilization during this period.
Third, the management of the economy to encourage growth and a careful
watch on inflation was not the primary concern of the socialist
government policies in the first decade of independence. At this
time, the state was grappling to turn a capitalist economy into
an egalitarian and more equitable structure and therefore tended
to emphasize on distribution and not production. Consequently, the
framework into which the demobilized members were expected to enter
became a highly contested territory into which individual members
became early victims. In the confrontation, the only place into
which comrades could be welcomed was the public sector. By the end of the first ten years, the capitalist economy began to falter and the jobless market kept expanding. Fifth, the initial policy had placed too much responsibility on the demobilized members with minimal state responsibility and almost no role created for the private sector to play toward resolving a ‘national problem’. It was therefore not surprising that many of the comrades attempting to enter into the private sector were met with hostile reception that tended to perpetuate philosophical differences, attitudes and approaches to business and profit.17 Given all these negatives that are fundamental to successful demobilization — lack of political will, no carefully considered demobilization plan, inadequate resources, a hostile economic environment that soon registered lack of growth, unemployment and rising inflation — the initial effort soon collapsed. Former combatants thrown into society without skills or further material assistance soon began to agitate for basic requirements such as accommodation and welfare support. The Storm Gathers, 1988-97 Thereafter, the establishment of a joint former liberation movement
War Veterans Association was a foregone conclusion. This occurred
in 1989 against vigorous efforts by the state through successive
Ministers of Labour and Social Welfare.18 Ministers Nathan
Shamuyarira, Florence Chitauro and John Nkomo had all acknowledged
government dereliction that had led to the destitution of the 19
163 ex-combatants. However, while they agreed to the further support
of the “Class of ‘83" they were ‘not prepared
to create a privileged class’ by making available grants to
a wider body of war veterans. [ Top ] In 1992, Parliament passed legislation formally recognizing the
War Veterans Association and making provision for government to
offer limited benefits. A narrow definition was adopted that has
led to serious problems of exclusion during the era of the second
initiative, as we shall see. The definition holds that, only: . . . those who had undergone military training and participated consistently19 and persistently in the liberation struggle which occurred in Zimbabwe and in neighbouring countries between 1 January 1962 until 29 February 1980.20 Given the adverse background, both ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres from late 1988, made concentrated efforts in order to influence government to pay attention to their deteriorating plight. Even those in full employment were finding it difficult to make ends meet and congregated around the sorry plight of the “Class of 1983”.21 Effectively, this was an indication that the initial attempts to demobilize had failed. In 1988, government admitted in parliament that its “Demobilization policy had failed to achieve the intended targets.”22 During the same debate, “it was estimated that 35 709 ex-combatants had been demobilized by 1988 and between 15 000 to 25 000 were without employment”.23 This admission should have served as an early warning as well as an indication that future efforts to solve the demobilization problem would need to focus on employment creation. But this obvious route was never pursued. The Second Policy on Demobilization and Reintegration, August
1997 to the Present Grants made by presidential decree defied all arguments that had
been advanced by his cabinet colleagues, especially the ministers
responsible for labour, and social welfare. In a single action,
the president’s action had not only reversed government policy
but went to accord further privileges and grants to serving members
in government and elsewhere, as long as they had been ex-combatants
and qualified according to the criteria above. As a direct result
of the policy, government paid out over Z$4.5 billion at $50 000
each to over 52 000 claimants with little or no consultation with
the taxpayers or officials expected to implement the policy. Average
economic growth between 1991-97 had been a disappointing 1.5% and
had not created a major surplus to be disbursed. While the principle of extending government assistance may be right,
it needs to be tampered with considerations of national economic
affordability and sustainability. Furthermore, the level of disbursements
made must take into account the primary aim of demobilization —
that of reintegrating demobilized soldiers permanently into society.
Consequently, the departure point for any credible policy is the
maintenance of economic stability for the rest of society, into
which the demobilized soldiers wish to enter. If the former is destabilized,
then benefits extended to the demobilized soldiers puts them in
a special class. This observation concerning the balancing act that
policy makers must attempt to ultimately achieve in undertaking
demobilization contains the seeds that will determine the success
or failure of the programme. The economy needed prudence and moderate expenditure policies in
order to reverse the stunted growth. Furthermore, each war veteran,
whether employed or not was to receive a pension worth $2 000 tax-free
per month. An unrealistic number stepped forward. Treasury was faced
with demands not only to finance the once off grants but had to
contend with unexpected long-term expenditure. By January 1998,
the state paid Z$106 million as monthly pensions to war veterans
and the figure was rising as more and more came forward to make
claims. In February, $109 million was paid.25 Because
the criteria used was loosely worded, soon, over 4 000 claimants
were soon discovered as frauds. The only recourse shown following
this revelation was that the “War veterans were to vet themselves
and submit names of fakes to their patron — the President.”26
Unfortunately, some of the monies hastily paid out have been irretrievably
lost.27 What is clear about the process and disbursement
undertaken is that national resources continue to be wasted. This
raises the important point of exactly who and how many ex-combatants
are there to be compensated? As it stands, the ruling party and
policies handed down from the presidential decrees do not exactly
lend themselves to these searching questions that are critical in
arriving at establishing a means test and marshaling ‘enough’
resources. Before we move to see exactly what errors of judgement
were made in the second policy, we need to look at its impact on
the wider Zimbabwean society. Because the grants and pensions had not been budgeted for, funding
the second demobilization initiative became problematic for the
Minister of Finance. First, he attempted to introduce special taxation
before the end of 1997. This was met by stiff resistance by workers
and the public who went on the streets to express their displeasure.
When these were then arbitrarily paid out in November, the dollar
crushed against other currencies, loosing over 73% of its value.
By January 1998, the events had caused price rises leading to serious
riots not only in the townships but also in the outlying regions.
People in Mutare, Gweru, Mrewa, Bulawayo and Harare experienced
running battles with the police who could not contain the very robust
and spontaneous peoples’ response to the economic hardships.
It was only after armed troops had been brought out that order was
grudgingly restored. Clearly, the funding of the lavish all-embracing
grants and pensions of former combatants had ignited the uneasy
relationship that existed. The downward trend has continued with
alarming speed. By the end of 1999 and early into 2000, inflation
had reached 74% before easing but was set to rise. Domestic debt
was over $93 billion from zero in 1980 and more than half the adult
population was unemployed.28 Given the political, social and economic upheavals that have resulted partly from the second policy, an interrogation of the factors reveals that at least four elements appear to have been missed out when the policy was announced. The first is lack of focus on the “Class of ’83.” Put differently, handing out exactly the same levels of grants and pensions to war veterans that had been unemployed since 1980 and those that are in cabinet or the top leadership of the armed forces creates a gap. The chasm is not narrowed or closed through this action. In fact, because the currency then collapsed by losing nearly three-quarters of its value, the “Class of ‘83” could not weather the economic hardships in the same way as the other employed colleagues. Second, handing out large sums of cash to previously unemployed and homeless privates who had no preparation for the windfall and with no strings attached turned out to be an ill-conceived idea. Many simply squandered the proceeds and within weeks were queuing outside government doors for further assistance. A possible suggestion would have been to provide partially assisted housing in the various towns funded by the grant and to be topped up by the individual over a period. As it stands, even after the grants were handed out, many have become worse off as the economy nose-dived soon afterwards, a situation from which it has never recovered. Third, the number of people being supported have placed an extra burden on a small economy that has less than two million formally employed workers that are providing the regular tax revenue. [ Top ] However, even as the new policy was being launched a number of
interest groups amongst whom were former political prisoners, former
war collaborators, past and present widows of former war combatants,
children of former combatants29 and curiously, former
Rhodesian African soldiers, emerged and began organizing themselves
in order to champion their particular position in a bid to secure
government largesse that, in their perception had been unfairly
extended to the war veterans. The various groups challenged the
criteria that had been hastily set up by the war veterans. The first to emerge and appears to have already won state and national
support for its cause is the Zimbabwe Political Detainees and Restrictees
Association (ZIPDRA), numbering over 7 000 members.30
These have argued that not only were they the first to organize
cadres to go for training outside the country but they themselves
could not physically leave the cells and homes around which they
were surviving under armed guards. In their defence, many were executed
for recruiting youths for military training. Because of the solid nature of their case, government has been
forced to backtrack on the exclusive criteria and instituted legal
action to cater for members of ZIPDRA. This change of heart has
also come about as a result of ‘prodding action’ from
ZIPDRA members who have ‘occupied’ known farms owned by
senior government officials and cabinet ministers in order to precipitate
favourable action from government. The second group to emerge and to robustly challenge the war veteran
benefits linked to the problem of demobilization is the Zimbabwe
Liberation War Collaborators (ZILIWACO). Formed at the time of the
disbursement of the benefits in late 1997, ZILIWACO has been led
by the recently deposed former Lance Corporal, Ranjinos Kawara.
With a membership of 35 000 they are made up of Mujibhas and Chimbwidos
(these claim to have provided intelligence and served as aids and
runners to the guerrilla movements).31 Some of them were eventually
trained locally to lay the odd mine or place explosives onto rail
lines, roads or near some vulnerable point in the then Rhodesia.32
Consequently, many of them refer themselves as “trained at
the front”.33 In order to press their point home, ZILIWACO
members engaged in the “de-campaigning” of the ruling
party in the rural areas. This involved rounding up all villagers
who were ZANU (PF) supporters and demand party cards, T-shirts and
other insignia. These were then publicly burnt or destroyed. Not
only were the methods employed by ZILIWACO a re-run of the liberation
struggle practices but this level of anomic violence alarmed the
ruling party that it hastily agreed to a meeting held at the Catholic
Centre, Silveira House, just outside the capital. Second, the agreement
to meet with ZILIWACO also reveals that government acknowledges
that it has partly erred in arriving at the exclusive criteria that
created a ‘privileged class.’ A third group to challenge the presidential policy on demobilization
and benefits emerged around the widows of deceased former combatants.
It is not clear whether or not these were from members of the “Class
of ’83” or from the wider body, but surviving wives also
stepped forward claiming that they also deserved benefits. The widows
faction soon split into two. Without any formal announcement, an
urban section numbering about 3 000 to 4 000 led by Mrs Tungwarara
was soon discovered to have been authorized to receive benefits.
This riled the other group of 12 000 mostly rural based women under
Mrs. Agnes Rusike who were not accorded similar privileges. A fifth group, if we accept the two distinct divisions of the widows,
also stepped forward expecting to be included. This was made up
of former Rhodesian African members. This forced both the Zimbabwe
National Army, an institution that was being employed to vouch for
the credibility of war fighters to issue a statement disowning the
former Askaris’ perceived right of compensation. The former
Rhodesian organizers then approached the British Embassy and former
Prime Minister, Ian Smith, for support that was also spurned. Finally, a children’s organization, made up of kids borne to deceased former combatants and had been left destitute also sought to convince government of their right to be supported through the second demobilization policy. As yet, no meaningful response has been received from the state following their establishment at the beginning of 2000. Given the policy on demobilization and the criteria put forward, a number of well-deserving categories have come forward to challenge the exclusive nature of that policy. [ Top ] While the initial demobilization effort in 1981-83 had placed a large measure of responsibility on the members to be demobilized, the second effort witnessed not only the shouldering of ‘all the burden’ but seeking that this be apparent especially to the war veterans. This posturing must be understood for what it is, posturing and pandering to artificial concerns of the war veterans for political expediency without coming up with policies that have any hope of permanently providing a solution to the core problems of the “Class of ’83”. Anything falling short of this is dealing in an exercise of semantics. This posture was and continues to be a development that is unfortunate. The Way Forward and Conclusions What lessons can we draw from the conduct of government on the
two initiatives on demobilization and civil reintegration since
1980? The point of departure in undertaking effective demobilization
is to define the problem, that is, demobilization must be part of
demilitarization and there has not been any serious demilitarization
undertaken by this government since 1980. Decisions have been made
from a political and security point of view, sacrificing any rationale
input. Demobilization is a national problem and requires all hands
on board in order to address it. The exercise so far has been provincialized
as a preserve of government, shutting out the business, the private
sector, churches and other support. The nation is also experiencing unprecedented economic pressure.
Domestic debt stands at over Z$93 billion and is rising, while inflation
is hovering at over 60% and is also set to increase. More than half
the adult working population is unemployed. Financial relations
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the
European Union (EU) have been suspended. Related bilateral relations
with Sweden and Denmark have also been put on hold as the world
urges the Zimbabwe government to respect court rulings from its
judiciary and desist from politically stirring violence, anarchy
and chaos. While a section of the war veterans has been involved,
it still is the duty of the government emerging after the June elections
to provide a permanent solution to the “Class of ’83”. Past experience has shown that countries that have succeeded in
the exercise attribute their success to macro-economic policies
within which demobilization is a small part. Generally, two important
control points have had their impact cascade to positively influence
peaceful and permanent reintegration. These are, the state encouraging
a growing economy through:
In this macro-framework, issues of demobilization are tasked to a triumvirate committee of the ministries of Finance, Education and Industry and Commerce and sometimes, supported by that of Housing and Local Government. The idea would be to harness both public and private support for the “national problem” as its resolution goes beyond the capacity of the state. The second stage once the policy framework is established at the highest level is to establish an agency or directorate that is charged with the coordination of the demobilization of the personnel as well as judiciously manage the resources allocated to the project. Although resources are generally always in short supply as they are finite, consideration must be made to muster ‘adequate’ amounts, even going out to seek donor support for the successful completion of the project. Its successful conclusion has direct implications on peace building. Finally, a time limit must be set and the implications of the exercise
disseminated to all key players. In other words, the exercise should
place a burden of responsibility on both the policy makers, the
implementers, and the demobilized members and the society. [ Top ] Endnotes
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