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Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies Limitations of UN Peacekeeping
Operations Where Conflict Did Not Result in Victory for Any Side:
Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone Introduction Peacekeeping operations had two broad tasks, namely to stop or contain hostility, thereby creating conditions for peace by negotiation, or to supervise the implementation of an interim or final settlement negotiated by the peacemakers. To accomplish peacekeeping tasks, the UN deployed two categories
of forces: observer missions consisting primarily of lightly armed
officers; and peacekeeping forces which consisted of light infantry
with the necessary logistic support. For example, with the inception
of Operation Des Nations Unies Au Congo (ONUC) in the Congo in 1960,
the mission only had lightly equipped troops without any land or
air transport. The ONUC commander was charged with establishing
law and order, acquiring freedom of movement for UN relief efforts,
disarming and retraining local military forces and preventing unilateral
superpower intervention.2 Post-Cold War turbulence between 1990 and 1994 led to huge UN peacekeeping
operations and the cost of these operations increased progressively.
Troop strength burgeoned from about 12 000 to well over 70 000,
with costs growing from half a billion dollars to over three billion.
The situations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia especially gave
a new role to peace forces. In both the former Yugoslavia and Somalia,
combat conditions, combined with hostility towards the UN from at
least one of the parties (in contrast with the consent and co-operation
on which traditional peacekeeping operations were based), led to
the partial or limited use of enforcement action in accordance with
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.3 At the request of the UN Security Council, the former Secretary-General
of the UN, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented An Agenda for Peace
in July 1992. In this document the former Secretary-General proposed
a significant broadening of the UN’s use of military force
to prevent conflict, halt aggression, and supervise and enforce
cease-fires and post conflict peacebuilding. Where cease-fires have
been agreed on but not complied with, Dr Boutros-Ghali urged the
Security Council to consider deploying peace enforcement units that
were more heavily armed than traditional peacekeeping forces.4 [ Back to the top ] Against this background it is commonly known that some UN peacekeeping
operations of the past decade were hard put to accomplish their
objectives. Specifically, this relates to deployments where conflict
had not resulted in victory for any side and where a military stalemate
or international pressure or both had brought fighting to a halt,
but at least one of the parties to the conflict was not seriously
committed to ending the confrontation. In other words, some UN peacekeeping
operations did not deploy into post-conflict situations, but tried
to create them. The UN has often found itself unable to respond effectively to
peacekeeping challenges in situations where at least one of the
parties was not seriously committed to ending the conflict. On African
soil, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone are
cases in point. Earlier, the UN terminated its involvement in the
Angolan peace process in February 1999 after years of futile peacekeeping
efforts by no less than four peace missions. This reality has resulted
in fierce criticism of the UN from a broad range of member states
and other role players. Hence, the Secretary-General of the UN,
Kofi Annan, appointed a Panel on UN Peace Operations in 2000. The
Panel published a report in August 2000 on the reform of UN peacekeeping
operations — commonly referred to as the Brahimi report.5
The report explicitly states that ‘[o]ver the last decade,
the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge (of
peacekeeping), and it can do no better today’.6 This article assesses the UN’s response to peacekeeping challenges in the DRC and Sierra Leone. It reflects in particular upon the current shortcomings of the UN system when operating in ‘complex emergencies’ and specifically in situations where conflict has not resulted in victory for any side. In addition, it endeavours to shed light on the implications of these shortcomings in view of the fact that the UN is still the international authority with the responsibility for dealing with international peace and security — especially in Africa where the demands for peacekeeping are arguably the greatest. Finally, special attention is given to the Brahimi report. Intervention in complex emergencies [ Back to the top ] Firstly, complex emergencies often involve states that either have no governments or have contending sources of authority. This implies that peace forces frequently have to steer between adversaries or even ignore national authorities altogether. Secondly, in the case of a collapsed state, a host government is likely to have lost control of a considerable part of its territories. This means that the reins of power have fallen from the hands of the state downward to street and village level. Factions are often organised in sub-groups, each with its own agenda for survival and revenge. Thirdly, the presence of large numbers of displaced people is normally the order of the day and often alters the operational environment. Driven from their homes and farms, men and boys carry arms while women and children eke out a hand-to-mouth existence in temporary shelters.8 Complex emergencies are also messy affairs: their physical influence
often spills over the boundaries of the relevant state; displaced
populations cross borders; faction leaders use neighbouring states
as safe havens, as conduits for combat supplies and as a source
of human power. Therefore, in a complex emergency the stabilisation
of the crisis zone is much more complicated than in earlier peacekeeping
operations. Stabilisation is a fragile but dynamic process that
requires the overall restoration of a broken-down society; one phase
of activity leading directly to another: disarmament to demobilisation
to political and economic recovery.9 The situations in the DRC and Sierra Leone fit the definition of a complex emergency. In each of these cases the UN has been presented with an operational environment that is very different to comparatively orderly ‘bufferzone peacekeeping’, where prototype peacekeeping doctrine would apply. Hence, peacekeeping challenges in these countries have been and still are immense and by no means a simple task. In theoretical terms, stabilisation would require a firm grip by the UN on the situation and it could take years to achieve a successful outcome. It would require a credible peacekeeping force with adequate financing
from states that have sufficient political resolve to stay the course.
For instance, the US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrook, told
UN officials and members of the US Congress that an operation in
the DRC might be the UN’s last chance to prove that it can
get peacekeeping right.10 Thus, if there is any outside
chance of resolving the conflict, much will depend on the ability
of the UN to successfully deal with the situation. Against this
background specific peacekeeping challenges in the DRC and Sierra
Leone are examined in more detail. Democratic Republic of Congo [ Back to the top ] Although the rebel advance across the DRC slowed towards the end
of 1998,12 the rebels won an important battle on 12 October
with the fall of Kindu, a town in the eastern part of the DRC. This
situation specifically demonstrated the rebels’ strength as
the Rwandan and Ugandan-backed Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie13
(RCD) deployed some 9 000 troops against around 6 000 on the government
side. Importantly, it showed the RCD’s strategic superiority.14
Shortly after, the RCD made advances towards Lubumbashi in the south
eastern Shaba (former Katanga) Province, while Pweto on the northern
shore of Lake Mweru on the border with Zambia also fell to rebels
on 22 December 1998.15 Eventually Angola and Zimbabwe managed to end the rebels’
offensive in the west as well as their hopes of a march on Kinshasa,16
but by the end of 1998 the RCD was moving on all fronts and made
its presence felt in every region. They were operating in the Equateur
Province in the northwestern part of the country, having passed
the town of Bumba, 300 kilometres downstream from Kisangani in the
northeast. They were dug in in Shaba Province where, on 20 October,
they captured 16 Zimbabwean soldiers from an aircraft which they
had forced to land at Kabalo, between Kindu and Kamina on the railway
line to Lubumbashi.17 Early in 1999, government troops
lost the battle for Lubao, 240 kilometres east of the diamond capital,
Mbuji-Mayi. Independent sources described President Kabila’s
position as follows: ‘Laurent Kabila’s forces are on the
run, with his foreign allies threatening to pull out.’18 It is evident that the DRC government lost control of a considerable
part of its territories — an important feature of a complex
emergency. Shortly after Kabila’s victory over Mobutu Sese
Seko it became clear that Kabila’s forces were too weak to
control the whole country. In fact, Kabila’s forces became
almost wholly dependent on assistance from Angolan, Zimbabwean and
Namibian forces who engaged in the conflict in support of the DRC
leader in August 1998. In 1999, it was estimated that the rebels
controlled almost 40 per cent of DRC territory.19 The political
situation in the DRC was summarised by the following report: ‘Kabila
is no longer in control, and the Congo is barely a sovereign nation.’20 It can also be pointed out that the population of the DRC has been
suffering. Typical of a complex emergency, sources reported at intervals
that rebel forces were responsible for massacres of hundreds of
civilians in the eastern parts of the country. In terms of human
security, the situation in the DRC has become unsafe for a large
part of the local population.21 Earlier reports indicated
an estimated 660 000 internally displaced people and an estimated
117 000 DRC refugees in the Central African Republic, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zambia. During the past few years, cholera and other
infectious diseases have spread rapidly throughout the population.
Recent reports claim that the fighting has cost the lives of hundreds
of thousands, and an estimated additional two million Congolese
have been displaced as a result.22 [ Back to the top ] It should be clear that the conflict in the DRC over the past years has been more complex than mere fighting between a government and a single rebel group. At least three rebel groups have been operating in the DRC since 1997, not only and always against the Kabila government and its allies (Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola), but against one another as well. In short, the RCD was the largest group, but is has split into two factions. One faction is led by the original leader Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, based in Kisangani (the third largest city in the DRC) and backed by Uganda, which wants to put pressure on Kabila to step down or secure its border. The other is led by Emile Ilunga, who has been elected by the RCD
to replace Wamba dia Wamba. Based in Goma, in Kivu, Ilunga is backed
by Rwanda whose main concern is the interests of Tutsis. The third
rebel group, the Mouvement de Libération Congolais23
(MLC) is led by Jean-Pierre Bemba and mainly operates in the northern
parts of the country. This group is also backed by Uganda (for the
same reason as above).24 Various armed groups or tribal
militias who oppose Tutsi dominance, such as the Mai-Mai in south
Kivu and the Wangilima in north Kivu further complicate the situation.25
In addition, there is the Union pour la Démocracie et le
Progrès Social,26 which has been the best-supported opposition
party over the past decade. Its leader, Ettiene Tshisekedi, seeks
negotiations between all parties as well as the withdrawal of foreign
troops.27 Finally, violent clashes in Kisangani between
former allies, Uganda and Rwanda, have added further fuel to the
crisis in the DRC.28 Diplomatic efforts in support of a peace process in the DRC gave birth to a cease-fire agreement that was signed on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka by the heads of state of the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the Minister of Defence of Angola. The agreement provided for a cessation of hostilities between all the belligerent forces in the DRC. It stipulated that all air, land and sea attacks were to cease within 24 hours of the signing, as well as the movement of military forces and all acts of violence against the civilian population. The forces were to disengage immediately.29 However, the rebel groups declined to sign the document, although the MLC and the RCD eventually decided to do so on 1 August and 31 August 1999 respectively.30 Significantly, the Lusaka cease-fire agreement also provided for an ‘appropriate force’ to be constituted, facilitated and deployed by the UN, in collaboration with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), to ensure the implementation of the agreement.31 [ Back to the top ] UN response Soon after, the Secretary-General stated that the experience gained
in deploying a small number of military liaison officers in and
around the DRC had only served to deepen the UN’s appreciation
of the operational difficulties at stake. However, he maintained
that the UN had to support the peace process to the full extent
of its capacity.33 These statements by the Secretary-General
followed in the light of accusations and counter-accusations of
cease-fire violations by the parties to the conflict. Reports also
indicated a build-up of foreign troops in the areas of Mbuji-Mayi
and Kisangani, while a serious confrontation between Rwandan and
Ugandan troops took place in Kisangani in August/September 1999.
The earlier split in the ranks of the RCD also persisted and on
1 October 1999, ‘RCD-Kisangani’ under Emile Ilunga (meanwhile
renamed RCD-Liberation Movement) moved its headquarters to Bunia,
instituted a ‘transitional government’ and declared the
establishment of new provinces in the Province Orientale. Against this background Secretary-General Annan requested the Security
Council on 1 November 1999 to authorise the setting up of an observer
mission in the DRC and the deployment of up to 500 military observers
with the necessary logistical and personnel support.34
Having considered the recommendation of the Secretary-General and
in the light of a deteriorating security situation in the DRC —
where the MLC and the Wamba dia Wamba faction of the RCD effectively
declared the cease-fire null and void35 — the Security
Council adopted resolution 1279, which authorised the setting up
of the UN Observer Mission in the DRC (MONUC) until 1 March 2000.36
In his recommendation to the Security Council on 1 November 1999,
Secretary-General Annan also indicated that the deployment of military
observers would be followed by a next phase, namely the eventual
deployment of a peacekeeping operation with formed units to assist
the parties in the implementation of the cease-fire agreement of
Lusaka and in strengthening the peace process in general, and also
to protect the UN personnel deployed in the DRC.37 During the meeting of the Security Council on 24 January 2000 there
were strong calls by African leaders for the deployment of a ‘full-fledged
UN peacekeeping mission’ without any delay. In view of this,
the Security Council adopted resolution 1291 and decided to extend
the mandate of MONUC until 31 August 2000. Furthermore, it was decided
to authorise the expansion of MONUC to include 5 537 (mainly military)
personnel. In short, the military tasks of the expanded MONUC would
include military liaison, monitoring the cessation of hostilities,
investigating cease-fire violations and verifying the disengagement
of the parties to the conflict.38 However, throughout 2000 the UN’s plan to send a peacekeeping
force to the DRC was hampered by a lack of commitment on the part
of the warring factions to uphold the cease-fire agreement. Specifically,
the extended MONUC has not been deployed in the DRC as a result
of numerous and continuous cease-fire violations in that country.
The Security Council has always insisted that a peacekeeping force
would be deployed only if there was relative peace on the ground
as well as adequate assurances that all international personnel
would be safe. In other words, the UN required firm commitments
to peace on all sides and an end to all hostilities and cease-fire
violations. The UN personnel who were to oversee the disengagement
of forces in the DRC have remained unable to deploy largely due
to the continuation of hostilities. Thus, in practical terms, the
UN has been unable and effectively impotent to avert conflict or
to end the political turmoil in the DRC since the outbreak of fighting
in 1997. [ Back to the top ] At the time of writing it was announced that President Kabila had been assassinated by a member of his body guard. This may open a new chapter on the civil war in the DRC, but it remains to be seen whether this will have a positive impact on efforts to find a way out of the impasse and lead to a political solution in this war-ravaged country. Sierra Leone The crisis in Sierra Leone — another typical complex emergency
— began in March 1991, when Liberian warlord (now President)
Charles Taylor armed a group of dissidents to hit back at the Sierra
Leonean government for allowing its territory to be used by Nigerian
planes for bombing missions against the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF). The RUF was faced with weak and incoherent opposition from
the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), which it managed
to overrun. The RUF then began seizing diamond mining properties
— the main source of hard currency for the government. By 1995,
RUF forces had effectively laid siege to the capital city of Freetown.
Anarchic conditions prevailed, with thousands of civilians being
slaughtered, raped and maimed in a relatively short time —
all in a bid to gain power through fear. In fact, the RUF became
famous for its particular brutal practice of hacking off limbs in
order to terrorise and subjugate the population.40 The Sierra Leonean government then turned to Executive Outcomes,
a South African based Private Military Company (PMC), to deploy
its personnel in Sierra Leone against the RUF with effect from May
1995. By late 1995, the siege of Freetown had been lifted and the
RUF headquarters to the east of Freetown had been destroyed. This
paved the way for peace talks between the government and the RUF
on 22 February 1996. Shortly after, on 26 and 27 February 1996,
the people of Sierra Leone went to the polls, long before there
was any sign of a firm cease-fire or peace agreement. After two
rounds of voting, and amidst gross intimidation of the voter population,
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People’s Party emerged
as President. [ Back to the top ] However, Sierra Leone’s short lived experiment with democracy came to an abrupt end on 25 May 1996 when Kabbah was violently overthrown in a typical coup d’etat by Major Johnny Paul Koromah. The international community immediately responded with condemnation of the take-over. On 26 May 1996 the OAU also condemned the coup and called for the restoration of constitutional order in Sierra Leone. Nigeria was especially swift to respond and took military action against the coup makers under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG’s efforts to dislodge the junta were met with fierce resistance by Koromah’s Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), but in February 1998, ECOMOG managed to stamp its authority on the situation. This resulted in the collapse of the junta and its expulsion from Freetown. Thus President Kabbah was returned to office. However, ECOMOG couldn’t establish its authority on the hinterland much beyond Freetown and rebels continued to brutalise and terrorise the local population. The situation devolved into a bloody and inconclusive enforcement engagement by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces.41 UN response and further developments After years of involvement in Sierra Leone, the new democratically-elected Nigerian government decided that it would no longer sustain its ECOMOG commitments and informed the international community that it would be pulling out its more than 10 000 troops.43 Generally speaking, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also found it extremely difficult to support their peacekeeping forces due to the extreme financial drain on their fragile economies.44 Under these circumstances, the rebels began an offensive to retake Freetown and managed to overrun most of the city in December 1998. All UNOMSIL personnel were evacuated. ECOMOG struck back and again installed a civilian government, although thousands of rebels were reportedly still hiding out in the countryside. The UN Special Representative then initiated a series of diplomatic efforts aimed at opening up dialogue with the rebels. Negotiations between the government and the rebels started in May
1999 and on 7 July of that year all parties to the conflict signed
a peace agreement in Lomé, Togo with a view to ending hostilities
and forming a government of national unity. The parties to the conflict
also asked for an expanded role for UNOMSIL and on 20 August the
Security Council authorised 210 military observers for Sierra Leone. [ Back to the top ] On 22 October 1999, the Security Council decided to terminate UNOMSIL
and to establish the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), a much
larger mission with a maximum strength of 6 000 military personnel,
including 260 military observers. UNAMSIL was given the task of
assisting the government and rebels in carrying out the provisions
of the Lomé agreement.45 According to UN Security
Council Resolution of February 2000 (a revised version of Resolution
1270 of 22 October 1999) UNAMSIL was given the following mandate:
In accordance with its mandate, UNAMSIL was given the task of helping
to disarm 45 000 former combatants. This was a mammoth task since
only 6 000 troops were deployed into the theatre, although 11 000
troops had been mandated by the Security Council on 7 February 2000.
By May 2000 it was reported that 16 000 former combatants had been
disarmed, but an estimated 28 000 continued to roam the countryside.47 In a letter to the Security Council, dated 7 March 2000, Secretary-General
Annan stated that progress in the peace process had been slow. He
specifically made mention of ‘little progress in disarmament
in the northern and eastern parts of the country’ and that
the security situation generally ‘remained tense and volatile’.
He also referred to several incidents involving UNAMSIL and combatants,
as well as the fact that the RUF elements had seized a large number
of weapons, ammunition and vehicles from a UNAMSIL contingent.48
As the UN further deployed to reinforce peace in Sierra Leone,
RUF rebels and renegade government troops continued to disrupt the
peace process, carrying out a lot of hit-and-run attacks on UN personnel.49 [ Back to the top ] Following on a number of incidents since January 2000, the RUF
strongly rocked the shaky peace accord in May 2000 by launching
attacks on towns and UN personnel. After killing Kenyan soldiers
(four deaths were later confirmed) in an attack on a UN contingent,
the RUF also wounded and captured several other UN soldiers.50
In the course of further events, the rebels eventually captured
some 500 UNAMSIL personnel as hostages. Some of them were later
released. After two months, in July 2000, all hostages were released,
but only after a rare display of force by the UN. This happened
after heavily armed UN soldiers moved into the rebel’s main
headquarters, Kailahun, in the eastern part of the country to save
222 UN peacekeepers that remained captured.51 Shortly
before, the deteriorating situation in Sierra Leone sparked Britain
to send paratroopers, marines, a variety of warships, helicopters
and transport planes to evacuate 500 British citizens, as well as
to offer support to UNAMSIL52 — an offer which certainly
kept UNAMSIL from disintegration. In the meantime, ordinary Sierra Leoneans suffered as the RUF rebels
were looting villages, burning houses, raping women and mutilating
civilians, especially in the north of the country.53 Moreover,
instead of being disarmed by the UN, the RUF obtained further weapons
by disarming UN peacekeepers, while many more weapons were purchased
through ongoing illicit diamond sales. In clear contravention of
the Lomé peace agreement, the RUF managed to smuggle gems
through neighbouring Liberia.54 Generally speaking, international reaction on the taking of UNAMSIL
personnel as hostages was one of shock and outrage. Critics hammered
the UN for its role and profile in Sierra Leone. The New York Times,
for example, stated that Sierra Leone demonstrated the danger of
sending a weak and inadequately trained peacekeeping force into
a country where there was no peace to keep. The paper called upon
the UN to quickly reinforce the 8 700 peacekeepers already there
and to regain control of an unravelling mission. For the New York
Times, the situation in Sierra Leone suggested a need to improve
the planning and execution of UN peacekeeping operations to ensure
that UN peacekeeping forces do not become casualties in the conflicts
they are supposed to help end. ‘An international force must
then be given the financial resources, manpower and disciplined
command needed to protect itself and effectively carry out its mandate.’55 [ Back to the top ] In a similar vein, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) stated
that the fate of the UN in Sierra Leone looked increasingly shaky.
‘As things stand there is no meaningful peace in Sierra Leone
to keep. If the UN force was supposed to overawe the locals and
effectively impose a settlement, then it simply wasn’t equipped,
configured or sufficiently well-trained to do so.’ The BBC
also reflected upon the fact that in both Bosnia and Kosovo a well-trained,
well-equipped force of Western troops was deployed rapidly with
overwhelming force. ‘Local militias would have been crazy to
resist.’ In these cases, major powers like the US, Britain
and France were heavily involved. Their forces — being part
of NATO — were also well used to working alongside each other.
In Sierra Leone ‘[t]he UN force is drawn from sub-Saharan Africa,
the Middle East and South Asia. Its soldiers have little experience
of operating together and in many cases have little experience of
this type of operation.’ However, the BBC made it clear that
‘[i]t is not their fault: major western powers have refused
to become involved.’56 It should also be noted that the debacle surrounding UNAMSIL has
reopened the discourse on the possible role of PMCs in suppressing
rebels in conflict-stricken countries. In fact, many observers and
analysts have strongly come out in favour of PMCs as part of the
answer to crises, such as the international community witnessed
in Sierra Leone.57 Since the massive taking of hostages by the RUF in May 2000, the UN has moved to increase the capacity of UNAMSIL to a maximum strength of 13 000. The troops now on duty in Sierra Leone constitute the largest peace force that the world body has currently assembled. However, Sierra Leone remains a serious test for the constrained UN. It remains to be seen whether UNAMSIL will be able to fulfil its mandate of disarming the RUF and keeping the peace in this war-torn country, especially in view of reports that UNAMSIL has been plagued by bitter internal disputes during the latter part of 2000. Assessment and concluding remarks [ Back to the top ] It is clear from the above that the principles of consent, impartiality
and defensive force did not feature as hallmarks of the recent UN
peacekeeping endeavours in the DRC and Sierra Leone. The Brahimi
report makes it clear that consent of the local parties, impartiality
and the use of force only in self-defence should remain one of the
bedrock principles of peacekeeping. However, it also states that
the experience of the past decade shows that consent may be manipulated
in many ways and that problems in dealing with challenges of this
nature did a lot of damage to the standing and credibility of UN
peacekeeping operations in the 1990s.59 In view of past and recent peacekeeping failures, Maninger60 argues that it is sometimes better to let the conflict burn until a clear winner emerges or the parties experience fatigue through mutual attrition. Accordingly, it is necessary for people in conflict zones to become tired of war before they develop a capability to reach a consensus that would be conducive to the resolution of the conflict and the implementation of a lasting peace. Although this may hold some truth, it could also be argued that conflicts such as those in the DRC and Sierra Leone constitute regional security threats and that they generate immense suffering for ordinary citizens. It is also clear that rebel groups are able to sustain their operations over long periods through transcontinental smuggling of precious and strategic minerals or other commodities. Therefore, the UN may not stay aloof. It would not live up to its
Charter, which states that the organisation was founded ‘to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,’ if it
would simply be absent or assume a marginal role in acute African
conflicts. In view of this, it is argued in the Brahimi report that the UN
has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge of peacekeeping, and
that ‘[w]ithout renewed commitment on the part of Member States,
significant institutional change and increased financial support,
the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical
peacekeeping and peace-building that the Member States assign to
it in coming months and years.’ However, the report also states
that ‘[t]here are tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces
should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not
go.’61 This raises the question: what about future
responses to conflicts in Africa and further afield where conflicts
did not result in victory for any side or where a peace settlement
has to be imposed? Will the UN in future only be prepared to engage
in conflicts where the contours of classical peacekeeping apply?
In other words, will the UN only be able to play a meaningful role
where the world body is not being asked to find and impose a peace
settlement, as for example in keeping the peace between Ethiopia
and Eritrea? [ Back to the top ] First of all, it needs to be noted that the limitations of the
UN have especially been exemplified in conflict-stricken African
states where the demands for peacekeepers are arguably the greatest
and regional contributions to UN peacekeeping face the most constraints.
It can be pointed out, for example, that the UN was relatively successful
in East Timor in 1999, where it was able to intervene in the conflict
with proper force mainly as a result of Australia and New Zealand’s
swift responses and their commitment to a (regional) peacekeeping
effort. Other contributions came from Thailand and the Philippines. In a similar vein, the European situation is especially evident
from developments in Kosovo, where the peace process draws on the
support of a number of wealthy nations that are members of the European
Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In Kosovo,
the UN enjoys the security framework provided by almost ten times
more European troops than the total number of UN troops proposed
for the extended MONUC in the DRC, i.e., close to 50 000. This implies
that where a peace process draws on the support of a number of wealthy
or relatively wealthy regional actors, the UN could still be successful
in conflict resolution and management. It boils down to the point
that the UN is still able to play a meaningful role in stabilising
complex emergencies, but specifically in cases where it can manage
to overcome the shortcomings of a relatively weak international
system of conflict prevention and management through a strategy
of burden-sharing and effective devolution of responsibility to
regional actors. However, Africa is not comparable to the developed world where
strong regional organisations are willing and able to play a role
in peacekeeping to complement UN efforts in acute civil conflicts.
It should be realised that there is an immense gulf as regards equipment
and training that effectively separates organisations in the developed
world from (sub)regional organisations, such as the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) and ECOWAS with its ‘military
arm’, ECOMOG. To this end, (sub)regional role-players in Africa
bring little capability towards sharing the burden of peacekeeping
requirements on the continent. The net result of this is a UN that
is not capable of executing critical peacekeeping tasks, particularly
on the African continent in situations where conflict had not resulted
in victory for any side. Against this background, the Brahimi report
makes the point that the UN needs renewed commitment to peacekeeping
on the part of member states; significant institutional change;
and increased financial support to be capable of executing critical
peacekeeping tasks assigned to it.62 Practically speaking, ‘renewed commitment’ to peacekeeping on the part of member states could mean that the international community should rethink the application of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which provides for a subsidiary but integral role for regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. Berman and Sams rightly point out that the five permanent members of the Security Council — led by the US — have become increasingly reluctant to commit their troops or their money to UN peacekeeping efforts, particularly in Africa. ‘As a result, the international community’s peacekeeping goals became decidedly more modest.’ Moreover, according to Berman and Sams, the five permanent members of the Security Council have embraced Chapter VIII disingenuously, to lend both respectability and legitimacy to some of their ‘selfish desires’. They also state that the objectives of the other four permanent members of the Council are not averse to the US approach. It is mentioned that China, for instance, is not enthusiastic about intra-state peacekeeping. Russia has been complaining that it would prefer the UN to play a greater role in peacekeeping operations where the Commonwealth of Independent States is active, but has benefited from the respectability that Chapter VIII bestows upon its peacekeeping activities.63 [ Back to the top ] In addition, France and Britain, like the US, apparently do not
see African security as a priority concern.64 Also, by
providing African countries with peacekeeping training, instruction
and equipment, the major Western powers hope to obviate the need
for them to intervene militarily in Africa. This is especially evident
from programmes driven by the US, France and Britain to develop
African peacekeeping capabilities.65
There is nothing inherently wrong with utilising regional and ad
hoc initiatives in the maintenance of international peace and security.
However, the major role-players need to commit themselves to a UN
that would be in a position to take primary responsibility for responding
to crises and armed conflict. In the words of the Brahimi report,
changes to the UN system would be meaningless unless member states
summon the political will to support the United Nations politically,
financially and operationally so as to enable it to be truly credible
as a force for peace.66 In addition, ‘renewed commitment’ implies that the UN
needs to overcome the financial pressures that have crippled peacekeeping
operations in the past decade. The UN is relatively weak and became
over-burdened in the 1990s with greater and greater responsibilities.
The UN relies on donations from member states, and these fall short
of providing the world body with the necessary ‘tools’
or means to address acute conflicts. In 1995, for example, Rita
Hauser, Chairperson of the Board at the International Peace Academy,
stated that ‘the UN is in such a deep financial crisis, it
must dip into peacekeeping funds in order to pay its secretaries
in New York’.67 Be that as it may, finance has dominated
argument about the role and structure of the UN in the past years.
Its financial predicament arises from an earlier failure or unwillingness
on the part of the former Soviet Union, France, and later the US,
to pay their assessments for peacekeeping operations. This has been
complicated by the US Congress’ view of the past years that
the US contributes too much to the regular UN budget,68
and this remains an important political issue in the US as part
of an ongoing competition between the Legislature and the Executive.
In fact, US arrears in UN administrative and peacekeeping dues recently
approached $2 billion.69 Furthermore, the Brahimi report suggests ‘institutional change’
to the UN ‘to remedy a serious problem in strategic direction,
decision-making, rapid deployment, operational planning and support,
and the use of modern information technology’.70 In the final analysis the report also states that when the United Nations does send forces to the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them. It would seem that much would depend on the successful implementation of the Brahimi suggestions. At the same time, the Brahimi report makes it clear that the UN’s recent peacekeeping challenges (of which the UN’s experience in Sierra Leone is certainly a case in point) suggest bigger forces, better equipped and more costly but able to be a credible deterrent. ‘Once deployed United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandate.’ But as the report also notes, the UN has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade that no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed.71 Thus it can be concluded that the UN will only be able to improve its capacity and capabilities to execute future critical peacekeeping tasks — especially in complex emergencies in Africa — if it can bring about a firm commitment on the part of its member states to respond meaningfully to the organisation’s current organisational and operational needs. After all, the UN is no more than the sum of its members and available resources. [ Back to the top ] Endnotes
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