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Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies The Winds of Change: The Role
of Public Information in the Era of Information Operations Democratic military public information has traditionally included
programs to build relations between the military and key audiences:
community leaders and citizens, one’s own forces, and the press.
U.S. military forces recently have consolidated public information
and other military information functions into the doctrine of “information
operations” (IO). This is in response to bad actors on the
international stage using mass communications (including the Internet)
to influence public opinion during armed conflict. This essay explores how the advent of information operations affects the perception, value, and practice of public information. The questions and implications have import for the practice of public information on the African continent as its countries seek to establish open public discourse. The Role of Information Operations Live worldwide television coverage of the Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM drove a new message home to the civilian and military leadership on both sides of that conflict. Public views of success or failure were being developed during, not after, events via the GIE. In short order, the U.S. military realized that “shaping the battle environment” must also include shaping the information environment. Failure to do so could create inaccurate and negative public perceptions about the U.S.-led coalition that could lead to its demise. Information Operations and Public Information [ Back to the top ] Power in truth telling makes public information a viable and valuable resource of the commander. The IO Cell Psychological operations are “planned operations to convey
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence
their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the
behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals.
The purpose of PSYOPS is “to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes
and behavior favorable to their originator’s objectives”.5 The Changing Role of Conflict Objectives — Opposing sides in a conflict pursue contrary
objectives. That pursuit occurs on three levels: tactical, operational,
and strategic. Tactics are actions that are intended to achieve
an objective. Operations are tactics that are planned and carried
out over a period of time. Strategic operations are directed at
attaining objectives in a specific theater (theater strategic).
Alternately, strategic operations may affect the citizenry and values
in one’s own nation (national strategic). [ Back to the top ]
It can be argued that when national media are present, any tactical
situation becomes strategic. For example, when the United States
sent forces to Somalia, their mission was to restore order in a
country that had been ravaged by famine. However, media coverage
that showed the public abuse of U.S. forces there effected a sharp
national reaction in the U.S. mission there. A tactical situation
in Somalia elicited a strategic outcome in the U.S., via the GIE.8 Two aspects of conflict have provided the impetus for public information
to evolve from a support role to an operational role: asymmetry
and deterrence. Asymmetry — In conflicts such as World War II, adversaries
conducted symmetric wars. Similar kinds of forces used similar types
of tactics. The sides and issues were in little doubt. In Kosovo, Slobodan Milosevic used U.S. citizen sensitivity to
potential casualties and to human rights as an asymmetric route
to try to weaken the NATO alliance’s cohesion. Apple9 described
Kosovo as the ultimate extension of asymmetry. It exemplified the
kind of complex, confusing crisis that takes place “in a twilight
zone, full of uncertainty, where rules are formulated (and broken)
as the participants choose. It is hard to know who is winning, sometimes
harder to know who has won”. Deterrence — Deterrence is the delay of armed conflict through
non-hostile means. It makes it possible to deny an adversary his
objective without exposing one’s own forces to jeopardy. For German military writer Carl von Clausewitz, deterrence provides
an alternative to all-out conflict. It is a measured response, “just
enough to checkmate the attempted aggression,” that can be
used as an alternative to mass retaliation. Such “straightforward
dealing” enables the commander to disarm the enemy through
the employment of an inner or moral courage. That inner courage
complements the physical courage that is more often associated with
hostilities.11 [ Back to the top ]
Deterrent effect can be used to suppress an adversary’s willingness
to launch aggressive action. This can delay an adversary’s
initiative. Such a delay can be used to accomplish a variety of
actions. For example, a delay can be used to buy to enable a coalition
to forge a consensus. The Role of Public Information Until the Vietnam conflict, public information practitioners acted
as controllers or gatekeepers of information and access. Media were
relatively few. Media representatives observed a reasonably consistent
set of conventions, although not always cordially. Military commanders
sought to obtain well-informed media coverage of events in the field.
Commanders also solicited insightful judgment about media coverage
through participation in editorial board sessions. Attention was
paid to the way that the media portrayed the command and issues
of concern to the command. The members of media were considered
to be best attuned to the interests of their subscribers, listeners,
or viewers. As a result, speed and accuracy of response to media
queries was the standard for public information staff performance. The contest for perceptions conducted in the GIE has changed that
role. Now, public information practitioners perform as an information
resource and initiator. Reactive methods such as imposing limits
and control have given way to three active methods that can be employed
to pre-empt those who would attempt to deny the military commander’s
objectives: revelation, explanation, and assessment. Revelation — Revelation brings to light information that is
not known. The ability to assess actual conditions before, during,
and after hostilities removes the potential for an adversary to
make false claims stick. Revelation can be used to effect deterrence. For example, the demonstration
of the actual capabilities of one’s own forces can give pause
to an adversary (as long as those capabilities can actually be brought
to bear). [ Back to the top ]
Revelation can also be used to deflate false claims that may be
used to solicit public sympathy. For example, an adversary might
claim that an opponent caused the destruction of an orphanage that
was actually a munitions cache. The release of accurate video or
still photo coverage of the damaged area could be used to deflate
the false claim by revealing it to be military asset. Explanation — Explanation provides a context for information
that is known but is not understood or that has been imbued with
a biased meaning. Such claims and counter-claims are the manner
in which much of the contest for public opinion is conducted. Countering
incorrect assumptions with fact can quell an otherwise chaotic situation
that adversaries can use to their advantage. Application to Practice Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR — Captain Mark Van Dyke, USN served
in 1996 at Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina as Chief of Public Information
for the Implementation Force (IFOR) while assigned as Director of
Public Information for Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH).
IFOR afforded NATO with its first chance to implement the “information
cell” concept as it enacted the Dayton Accords. Van Dyke recounts that, in addition to political, economic, and
military elements, “public information was one of the four
main elements of power used by the international community’s
military leaders to shape the operational environment, deter potential
conflicts and resolve crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina”. Through
the efforts of a common information cell, civil affairs, public
information, and political advisors developed and implemented an
IFOR information campaign (IIC) in order to coordinate the daily
IFOR message that was synchronized with operations. IFOR recognized the need for public information and psychological operations to remain separate, in order for public information to remain credible. The IFOR information cell maintained a partition between PSYOP and public information by assignment. PSYOP communicated directly with the Bosnian people. Public information communicated with the domestic (U.S.) and world publics via the mass media. Continual coordination among cell members ensured that communications were consistent and implemented according to IFOR policy. Public information has now become a prime asset for the commander on the battlefield of perceptions. IFOR efforts were hampered by a lack of manpower, by NATO staff
who had no public information experience, and by a lack of NATO
internal information doctrine. Väätäinen12 noted
that the six-month rotations for IFOR staff made it all but impossible
for them to grasp Balkan issues and to develop meaningful contacts
with the media. International and local press, Despite the rigors that the combined environment imposed, Van Dyke
considered the program to have been a success. Information operations
were “used to shape opinions and attitudes, deter aggressive
actions, and diffuse crises when they did occur”. “Research
done of press conferences during JOINT ENDEAVOR indicates that interviews
and press conferences with commanders were among the most credible
and effective means of communicating IFOR’s message to the
public”. 13 Operation ALLIED FORCE — U.S. participation in NATO operations
in support of Kosovo was the first opportunity to exercise public
information in the information operations environment during hostilities.
The experience, which spanned 1998 through to 1999, shows mixed
results. [ Back to the top ]
The air campaign began in March, 1999. Senior staff at U.S. European
Command (EUCOM) headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany was already
conversant with information operations doctrine. They had already
stood up an IO cell and had developed a comprehensive IO plan. The
plan was provided to NATO in order to help move the new approach
forward. It would serve in effect as a substrate for the NATO IO
effort. In the end, ALLIED FORCE lasted only three months. The brief
time was too short to deploy public information resources or to
establish and operate a full PA/IO effort. The “information war” continued long after hostilities ended.14 Claims over the effectiveness of NATO bombing were still being argued well after the conflict subsided.15 To this day, public sentiment in Kosovo and Serbia regarding the outcome of the operation remains an open topic of debate. Public Information in the Information Operations Era Operational — Public information is now among the resources
that the commander employs to achieve campaign objectives when dealing
with an adversary. No longer a support role, the focus of public
information is on operational campaign objectives. Practitioners
who are unfamiliar with the sophistication that is necessary for
intra-service, inter-service, allied, and combined collaboration
will be unable to earn and sustain the trust of the operational
commander. Public information now operates relative to the actions and messages
of adversaries while events unfold. Public information practitioners
must cultivate a razor-sharp situational awareness. Those who succeed
in this role will be able to sense what adversaries are able to
and likely to do, and have a variety of options ready on how to
proceed as the campaign evolves. Initiative — The public information message is linked to the
battle commander’s objectives. Public information staff members
collaborate with other information cell participants to plan and
execute information campaigns. This requires a strong sense of how
to employ truth telling as a deliberate command role. Public information
practitioners need to apply an aggressive, incisive intellect to
support the command mission. The information war begins long before any organized deployment
of forces. Public information resources need the equipment, transportation
resources and professional skills to act as independent advance
forces. Adversary-oriented — Unlike the traditional model of friendly-only
communications, the adversary is now a key audience. Public information
assumes the responsibility to understand key issues, culture, decision-makers
in that audience, as well as to assess outcomes with that audience.
This requires those who practice public information to learn the
culture, behavior and language of each area in which they operate.
That includes regular, as well as irregular, parties that may have
occasion to influence the position of the commander’s forces. Inclusive of all services, agencies — Participation in IO activities integrates political leaders, civilian agencies, non-governmental agencies, as well as military services. Public information practitioners need to grasp the range of interests and approaches that each participant brings to the table. [ Back to the top ]
Conclusions The future is not certain, however. Many aspects of public information
practice and its employment by senior staff and unit commanders
will need to be resolved. In addition, those who practice the role
of public information will need to step forward and meet the “information
war” challenge. As the Balkans conflicts have recently shown,
bad actors can exert more influence that one might suspect by waging
asymmetric conflicts. Public information’s role in injecting a “well-timed” truth can strike a telling blow in these circumstances. But revelation, explanation and assessment require news skills and abilities among those who use them. The challenge now for those who rely on this new role and who practice this new role is to shape it, learn it, and use it. Endnotes
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