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Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies Understanding State Failure in
Zaire/Democratic Republic Of Congo Introduction In this context, it will be attempted to critically discuss the phenomenon of the failed/collapsed state in Africa, with specific reference to Zaïre/DRC. This will be done by identifying factors that cause/contribute to state collapse. As a basic starting point, however, and also to facilitate a clearer understanding of this discussion, it is essential to first indicate what the concept of a failed/collapsed state constitutes. What is a Failed/Collapsed State? According to the Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, a state
is “a distinct set of political institutions whose specific
concern is with the organization of domination, in the name of common
interest, within a delimited territory” (McLean 1996: 472).
Zartman The juridical requirements that entities have to comply with before
being accepted as states in the international community, are set
out in the Montevideo Conference of 1933. These requirements are
as follows: A state must:
[ Back to the top ]
It should further be noted that, since the Montevideo Conference,
a fifth requirement has become generally accepted, namely that of
international recognition of an entity as a state. This is illustrated
by the example of the former TBVC-states in apartheid South Africa
who fulfilled the first four requirements for statehood but were
not recognised as such by the international community. Relating the requirements for statehood to the functioning state
organs (e.g. decision- making structures such as executives and
parliaments; decision-enforcing institutions such as bureaucracy
and security forces; and decision-mediating bodies such as courts).
Chazan et al (1999: 40) declares “the precondition for the
effective functioning of state organs is military control of a given
territory (security) and some recognition of a given territory (international
and/or domestic legitimating)”. The operational capabilities
of the organisations in the public domain rely, in fact, on the
skill and loyalty of officials (expertise) and on the revenue at
their disposal. The authority of states is measured, then, in terms
of the supremacy of their laws over those of other groups in the
population. Zartman (1995: 5) continues with this argument by showing
that the state basically fulfils three basic functions, namely as
the accepted source of identity and the arena of politics (the state
as sovereign authority); a tangible organisation of decision making
while an intangible symbol of identity (the state as an institution);
and finally, the state as a guarantor of security (encompassing
both politico-military and socio-economic security) for a populated
territory. Weiss [in Zartman (ed.) 1995 : 157) further adds to this
the idea that some sort of social contract exists between the state
organs and society, according to which, the state has the responsibility
to seek the welfare of its citizens failing which the state loses
its legitimacy as the presumed authoritative manager of society. Bearing the discussion above in mind, it follows logically that
a failed or collapsed state is marked by a situation where the basic
functions of the state are no longer performed. As Zartman (1995:
9) observes, “state collapse is marked by the loss of control
[by the state organs] over political and economic space”, with
regime breakdown as the end result of the inability to “meet
and overcome the crisis that has afflicted public agencies and to
establish a modicum of socio-political exchange” (Chazan et
al. 1999: 155). Drawing on the work of Badie and Birnbaum (1983),
Migdal (1987), Poggi (1978) and Ferrero (1942), Zartman (1995 :
5) paints an eloquent and dramatic picture of state collapse: As the decision making center of government, the state is paralysed and inoperative: laws are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced. As a symbol of identity, it has lost its power of conferring a name on its people and a meaning to their social action. As a territory, it is no longer assured security and provisionment by a central sovereign organization. As the authoritative political institution, it has legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs, and so has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs. As a system of socio-economic organization, its functional balance of inputs and outputs is destroyed, it no longer receives support from nor exercises controls over its people, and it is no longer even the target of demands, because its people know that it is incapable of providing supplies. No longer functioning, with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy, it has lost the right to rule. Why Do States Fail/collapse? The Experience of Zaire/Democratic
Republic of Congo As a basic assumption, however, it should be positioned at the
start that no single factor or “variable” explains the
phenomenon of the failed/collapsed state in Africa. Instead, it
is agreed with Wunsch [in Wunsch and Olowu (eds.) 1990: 7)] that
a multi-causal approach to the issue is both desirable and necessary,
which leaves us with yet another question: what are the factors
that cause or contribute to the failure/collapse of states? [ Back to the top ]
Among various authors, such as Chazan et el. (1999), Coleman [in Sklar (ed.) 1994], Matthee (1999), McNulty (1999) and Thomson (2000), there seems to be a high level of agreement that these factors are both internal and external to the state, and consist of mainly political and economic factors. Concerning the case of Zaire/DRC, the factors of regional dynamics are also mentioned, while social factors are normally co-opted to these broader categories. Although the basic structure of factors, as suggested, will be maintained, a fourth category of factors will be introduced, namely the factors of a psychological nature. Political Factors In the words of the journalist Marq de Villiers (in de Villiers
and Histle 1997: 185), “the colonial history of Zaire, or the
Belgian Congo, is perhaps the most extraordinary, not to say outlandish,
story of the scramble for Africa.” After the British pleaded
ignorance, King Leopald I of Belgium claimed the territory for himself,
“legitimated” by a geographical conference in Brussels,
but the territory was later seized by the Belgian government due
to the large extent of atrocities that were committed under Leopold’s
rule. According to de Villiers [in de Villiers and Histle 1997 :
185], “the Belgians saw it as a matter of honour to remedy
the evils for which they were responsible, [but] were lackadaisical
in its execution. Belgium didn’t concern itself with education,
or training Africans to govern. Probably honour didn’t demand
it”. The result was that, when the Belgian Congo gained its
independence from Belgium in June 1960, the new state inherited
a political system consisting of colonial state structures, characterised
by functional constructs and personal networks, as well as some
local power structures from the pre-colonial and colonial era, that
were quite foreign to the incumbents (Matthee 1999: 89). It is partially
because of this colonial legacy, prevalent all over Africa, and
the problems that it was to cause, that led Davidson (1992) to proclaim
the “curse” of the nation state as the “black man’s
burden”. The newly independent state got off to an inauspicious start, when
the army, led by Colonel Joseph Mobutu, took control from Prime
Minister Patrick Lumumba within five days of independence. Through
UN-intervention, order was restored, but Mobutu took the opportunity
of constitutional deadlock after parliamentary elections in 1965
to intervene in the political process for a second time, marking
the start of a 32-year rule. While his rule initially seemed successful,
Mobutu soon set off on a strategy of state centralisation and the
personalisation of power which would eventually send Zaïre
(as it was renamed in 1971) on its journey of state collapse (Thomson
2000: 205-206). It was, then, a situation of centralisation and
fragmentation at the same time. Mobutu’s strategy was similar to the systematic efforts of
the part of new state leaders all over Africa to overcome the constraints
of the colonial legacy by reorganising public institutions and concentrating
power at the political center, namely these leaders and their allies
themselves. It took the form of two phases described by Chazan et
al (1999: 46-64), namely first the concentration, and secondly,
the elaboration of state power. The first step in this process revolved around limiting the opportunities
for opposition. Mobutu, noting the failure of political parties
to stabilise the country after independence, replaced multi-party
democracy with a one-party structure and took charge of all aspects
of the state. Accordingly, he came to dominate the legislative,
judicial and executive roles of the state, and did so using many
methods to consolidate both his position of power and one party
dominance. Co-option, harassment, imprisonment, exile and assassination
were just some of the methods used to systematically eliminate sources
of opposition, while Mobutu also used a well-developed system of
patronage to ensure loyalty and support of his rule. As Thomson
(2000: 208) puts it, “No one, friend or foe was left in any
doubt about who held supreme power in Zaïre. To challenge Mobutu
was to risk losing everything, including one’s life”.
During the early nineties, of course, Mobutu was forced to share
power with some form of democratic structures and he brought back
multi-partyism with a vengeance. When confronted with opposition
parties, however, he changed his mind and resorted to different
methods of division, patronage and deceptive concessions to re-establish
some authority over his opponents (Matthee 1999: 90). [ Back to the top ]
Apart from institutional readjustments, Mobutu started with an
appropriation of nationalist symbols in the hope that he would be
seen as the embodiment of the nation. From 1971 onwards, presidential
decrees were issued in a drive of authenticité, which included
changing the name of the state, important cities and Mobutu himself
(McNulty 1999: 59). The personalisation of decision-making in Zaïre
was a concomitant of the overall trend towards centralisation of
state power in the hands of Mobutu. Therefore, leadership became
a substitute for regularised channels of policymaking, as it was
Mobutu who had the final say in issuing key policy rulings. Indeed,
his public statements had the effect of law (Chazan et al. 1999:
53). Together with patron-client networks, Mobutu’s iron-grip over
the security forces formed the basis of his regime. A security force
separated from the regular military, the Special Presidential Division
(SPD), in particular played a key role in enforcing Mobutu’s
political will, and as such, he made sure that the SPD-members were
paid regularly (Matthee 1999: 90). It was this control of the security
forces that enabled Mobutu to maintain his grip on state power,
despite several insurgencies like the Shaba-secessionist attacks
in 1977 (McNulty 1999: 62). Despite all of these measures, Matthee
(1999: 90) remarks that there was no real political authority beyond
the capital city of Kinshasa, but nevertheless, the presidential
network had information about what was going on in the rest of Zaïre.
Thomson (2000: 210) expands upon this by noting that it was “almost
if Kinshasa was content to rule only strategic exclaves in the country
… the major cities, important trading centres and sites of
extraction (such as mines) — all the key areas that could still
produce a profit for the benefit of state managers”. From the above, it is clear that association with the state complex
began to emerge as the key avenue to social advancement and class
differentiation. Following this, one might ask what effect this
had on the relationship between the state and the population of
Zaïre. According to Thomson (1999: 208), whereas the political elite enjoyed the wealth its access to state
institutions brought, most individuals gained little from their
government. Members of civil society were the victims of a declining
economy, public services were shrinking, and they were often on
the wrong end of demanding corrupt officials. Yet there was no constitutional
way of ridding Zaïre of this kleptokratic elite. No effective
opposition parties existed, and any political challenge that Mobutu
perceived to threaten this regime was brutally crushed. Mobutu,
until the final days of his regime, maintained agencies of violence
that were more than a match for civil society. Lacking the ability
to change the incumbent government directly, the Zairians opted
for the next best option. They sought to distance themselves as
far as possible from the state. Therefore, while Mobutu remained in control of Kinshasa, some groups,
as well as regional and local power structures, became semi-autonomous
from formal state structures (Matthee 1999: 90). When Mobutu’s regime was finally toppled by Laurent Desire Kabila’s Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL) in 1997, the new administration had to start almost at zero, as there was no state to collapse (McNulty 1999: 74). Unfortunately, due to the current conflict in the DRC, this process has not yet begun. Indeed, it almost seems as if Kabila is following in Mobutu’s footsteps. [ Back to the top ]
Economic Factors Official statistics soon showed that the economy was a disaster,
with an annual inflation rate in excess of 1000 percent, national
debt of $13 billion and wages at starvation levels. Meanwhile, a
parallel economy was developing in the form of informal markets
as a means to escape the predatory state. The second economy set
about supplying what the official economy could not, and few were
thus willing to supply the official market. As the economic market
crisis grew larger, the state’s resource base was weakened
and the patronage networks had to be scaled down accordingly. To
maintain their privileged positions, state elites found themselves
in the precarious position that they still had to placate their
stronger clients, with the result that no resources could be distributed
to the citizens of Zaïre. Consequently, health care, education,
security, agricultural assistance and other public services virtually
disappeared, while infrastructure was also allowed to decay (Matthee
1999: 91 and Thomson 2000: 209). Matthee (1999: 91) also points
out that the weakening of state institutions was marked by a collapse
of control over economic space in the eastern part of the country,
as illustrated by the dominance of cross-cutting trade interests
and the use of Ugandan and Rwandese currency in East Zaïre. The economic breakdown also led to the prevalent occurrence of
bribery and corruption at all levels, eloquently described by Thomson
(1999: 207): “From the state president down to the humblest
government clerk, corruption was an everyday part of life in Zaïre.
It became a case of citizens having to buy public services through
private negotiations with the official concerned.” As Archbishop
Kabanga of Lubumbashi wrote in a 1976 pastoral letter: “why
do our government officers force people to come back day after day
to obtain services to which they are entitled? If the clerks are
not paid off, they will not be served … Whoever holds a morsel
of authority, or means of pressure, profits from it to impose on
people and exploit them . . .” This situation clearly indicated the collapse of the state in Zaire,
as the state organs lost control over the political and economic
spaces and couldn’t perform the basic state functions of looking
after the needs of its citizens. The state neglected its responsibility
to seek their welfare, leaving the population either to its own
devices, or forcing them to bribe the very officials that were supposed
to serve the people. As Weiss [in Zartman (ed.) 1995: 166] noted
after quoting from Le Monde Diplomatique of March 1993: “‘the
infrastructure, roads, means of communication have disappeared,
the universities are closed, the hospitals have become mortuaries,
the campaigns to fight the great epidemics are suspended and one
no longer measures the ravages of AIDS’ — this is the
portrait of a collapsed society”. Again, no attempts have been made to reverse this situation, since Kabila came to power. Involved in military conflict with rebel forces backed by Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila uses major mines both for personal benefit and the financing of the war effort. The latter also involves granting mining concessions to his own domestic and foreign allies. According to Matthee (1999: 99), there is evidence that the AFDL-rebellion actually represented an intensification of pre-rebellion processes of wealth accumulation. [ Back to the top ]
Regional Dynamics Fanon has been quite right to a large extent. The current crisis
in the DRC is having serious repercussions for the Southern African
region. Not only has it involved many states in the conflict (such
as Chad, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Namibia), but is also causing
tension between the members of the SADC itself. Apart from these
repercussions on the international regional level, it is also causing
domestic dissatisfaction in the involved states themselves. The
effects are not limited to the political-military arena either,
as it also led to a serious reduction in investor confidence in
the region as well, not even to mention the social impacts such
as refugee movements. It is not the first time that such a situation has loomed in the
region — Zaïre experienced secessionist revolts twice
before in the province of Katanga, first in the early 1960s after
independence and again in the 1970s. Both times, it had the potential
to escalate into a regional conflict, such as when secessionist
attacks in 1977 were launched from Angola. “Fearing a Zaïrian
collapse, which would suck the states of the region into a bottomless
central African ‘heart of darkness’” (McNulty 1999:
54), was a principle reason given by Mobutu’s backers (such
as France and the US) for their continued support to his regime,
as they were convinced that Mobutu was the only person who could
prevent such a collapse. Ironically, it was Mobutu who contributed
so much to the collapse of his As referred to above, the deterioration of infrastructure, coupled
with the subsistence of undisciplined security forces on extortion
and smuggling, virtually cut off the eastern provinces of Zaïre
from Mobutu’s control. Additionally, this was also the region
where anti-Mobutu insurgent groups had been able to survive for
decades, including Kabila and his followers. Many ethnic Tutsis
have also been residing there for generations, but Mobutu tried
to deprive them of their citizenship and to dislodge them from the
land they occupied. Therefore, it gave local groups like the Tembo
and Nande the opportunity to violently pursue land claims against
the Zaïrian Tutsis — an opportunity they readily exploited
(Matthee 1999: 92). In the process, it was a further example of
how the state institutions were sidestepped in Zaïre. Eventually, these circumstances presented the proverbial spark that would lead to the toppling of Mobutu. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 caused a million Hutu refugees to pour into eastern Zaïre in fear of retaliation after the exiled Tutsi military under Paul Kagame emerged victorious. When thousands of Rwandan ex-soldiers and militia used the border refugee camps as a cover to launch attacks against Tutsi settlements in the region, Mobutu provoked the new Rwandan government by doing nothing to resolve the situation. To complicate matters further, Uganda had to contend with Mobutu-supported insurgent groups, and so both Uganda and Rwanda had interest in a change of government in Kinshasa. By supporting the AFDL of Kabila, the wheels of the final rebellion against Mobutu were set in motion (McNulty 1999: 76-80; Matthee 1999: 92-93 and Thomson 2000: 212). Psychological Factors On a certain level, it might be argued that the population was
forced to withdraw from the formal state institutions due to the
practical constraints surrounding them, but that they might have
still supported the institutions (and Mobutu) in principle. Psychological
factors also played an important role in the failure/collapse of
the state in Zaïre/DRC. [ Back to the top ]
When the Belgian Congo became independent in 1960, it is reasonable
that its citizens had certain expectations of the new post-colonial
political authority. When these expectations were thwarted by the
problems experienced directly after independence due to politico-military
instability, they were rekindled when Mobutu rose to power in 1965
— perhaps even more so. People regarded Mobutu as the only
person who could restore order and stability and thus lead the country
forward, and for the first few years of his rule, he indeed seemed
to meet their expectations. When it eventually became clear that Mobutu was exploiting the
country for personal gain, as well as to consolidate and strengthen
his own position (through patronage for example), the psychological
shock of expectations deliberately thwarted yet again resulted in
people becoming more alienated from state structures. The gap of
relative deprivation between their expectations and what they perceived
they would get, was too great, and accordingly they made a conscious
decision to withdraw their support from the little formal state
institutions that was left, causing Mobutu’s legitimacy to
plummet to virtual non-existence. As it was quoted above: “They
sought to distance themselves as far as possible from the state
“(Thomson 2000: 208). Obviously, this exacerbated the collapse of the state in Zaïre/DRC even further, but the population’s distancing itself from the state had the even more wide-ranging impact of affecting the roots of the Zairian social identity as well. As noted above, Mobutu attempted to forge a national Zairian identity during his early years in power — not only to overcome the colonial legacy that left Zaire as a vast territory comprising a heterogeneous population of more than 200 ethnic groups, but to consolidate his own position as well. Any successes that he might have achieved in this respect, however, have certainly been wiped out as the population’s disillusionment with his regime grew larger. Left to their own devices in order to meet their basic needs, ethnic bonds held stronger than the flawed artificial ones of a common citizenship that Mobutu tried to create, and both individuals and groups increasingly carved out their social identity along ethnic and linguistic lines — carrying along the potential seeds of conflict. Eventually conflict did erupt, as groups like the Hunde, Tembo
and Nande took the opportunity of the security vacuum in eastern
Zaire to further their own interests (in the form of land claims)
against those of the Zairian Tutsis who were their fellow countrymen.
This is but one illustration of the increased ethnic fragmentation
that took place in Zaire/DRC. But this societal fragmentation of
a shared identity undoubtedly formed another link in the chain that
completed the circle of state collapse in Zaire/DRC. Conclusion [ Back to the top ]
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