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Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies Book Reviews From the Barrel of a Gun — The United States and the War
Against Zimbabwe, 1965-1980, by Gerald Horne (University
of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001), Introduction This review has also assumed special significance.
It comes at a time of potentially damaging relations between the
US and Zimbabwe given the recent steering of the Zimbabwe Democracy
Bill in Congress as a result of the latter’s approach to land
reform.2 The Zimbabwean political leadership has continued
to play the race card trying to draw parallels in the US, seeking
to link the current diplomatic hiatus with the race issue as manifested
in the work being reviewed as the determinant to the acrimonious
relations between Washington and Harare.3 [ Back to the top ] Since the independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980, relations with the US have been characterised by cordial, vague, sometimes acrimonious and dismissive periods. The gyrating relations, that have never been warm, occurred across the reign of the different US major parties of the Republicans and the Democrats versus the long-reigning political leadership of President Robert Mugabe and the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front), ZANU (PF). This is significant. White settler interests were and continue to be the main concern of US policy. This overriding concern constitutes an interesting nuance in American internal politics as manifested in its foreign policy conduct. This complex interface has so far not been fully understood by many external actors, including many African governments judging by their response to US government overtures on the African continent and on Zimbabwe in particular. But what is the background and context in which Gerald Horne’s
work fits? Put differently, why did war break out, sporadically
at first, in 1966 and with increasing intensity from 1972, and only
ended in 1980 in Zimbabwe? The genesis of the colony called Rhodesia was, in 1890, carved
out by force from the existing space amongst the two main population
groups of the Shona and Ndebele residing generally between the Zambezi
River to the north and the Limpopo river to the south. The quest
then was to establish the Second Rand following the discovery of
gold in the Transvaal, South Africa, in 1867. In order to effect
this, The British South Africa Company (B.S.A. Co.), had obtained
a Charter, a legal instrument from the British, empowering it to
act on the latter’s behalf in investing in new territories
for the empire. A white-settler nucleus comprising mine workers,
butchers, barbers, gamblers, traders and priests, escorted by a
well armed force of 500 soldiers made up the Pioneer Column4
that marched into the country from Bechuanaland [now Botswana].
Marching on a straight line to Mazoe, where gold lodes had been
discovered, the Pioneer Column established strategic forts on the
border with Bechauanaland, at Tuli, Victoria, Enkeldoorn and Salisbury.
They reached Salisbury in September of 1890 and raised the British
flag. No significant amounts of gold were discovered and by 1891, the
Company turned to other activities in order to survive. To its credit,
within a generation, the BSA Co. managed to attract major overseas
investment in beef, tobacco, small-scale mining and exploitation
of timber and citrus fruit. These financial interests, many of them
with linkages to entities in the Union of South Africa, played a
similar role as the BSA Co. in facilitating the exploitation of
the country. [ Back to the top ] The white minority colonial state continued to use violence in
governing the country. The BSA Police was an all white para-military
force. The services of all white males resident in the colony could
be called upon. At the bottom end of the military force were African
troops, initially only armed with sticks and knobkerries, and after
1940 with guns but under the tightest of controls. With this security arrangement in place, the colonial state and
white settlers proceeded to carry out what can only be described
as rabid exploitation and capital accumulation. Summary acquisition
of fertile farmland from existing local communities; wholesale dispossession
of cattle holdings;5 the unbridled coercion of African
labour power to work on the farms and small mining centres; the
dispossession of grain by forcing the hirtherto barter trading community
to raise cash in order to meet “cash payments for personal,
hut and dog taxes” occurred with little restraint. In order to increase the security of the small white settler community, apart from the para-military police forces and armed Native Department officials, a concerted disarmament programme against the African community that had been introduced by the colonial state in 1893 was pursued. Its effect was to further the entrenchment of the white political authority. The Native Department with the support of the BSA Police carried out the exercise. Undertaken in parallel with the periodic military pacification exercises in the villages, the assault on the indigenous peoples soon delivered to the emerging towns and mining centres, a thoroughly subjugated African worker. However, the process had also sowed the seeds of bitterness between the races and set the scene for a protracted struggle in the future. A number of important works have appeared documenting the evolution
of the colonial state and its systematic dispossession of the African
peoples. On the fundamental question of land we have the excellent
exposition of the machinations of the Land Commission by, P. Stigger
analyzing the achievements of The Land Commission of 18946. Between
1893-97,7 two military forays, with the assistance of
the regular British Army, as well as similar elements from the Union
of South Africa, were carried out by the BSA Co. to further break
the resistance of the indigenous peoples. The first was into Matabeleland
in 1893-94, and later followed by Mashonaland in 1896-97. This resulted
in the subjugation of both the Ndebele and Shona polities. Thereafter,
the indigenous African population was relocated to the “Reserves”
courtesy of the American BSA Co. official, Alvord. During the life
of the Responsible Government that took over from the BSA Co. in
1922, the process of “racist based capitalist ‘super-exploitation’
and white capital accumulation”8 was intensified.
Lines of capitalist production and industry were established in
beef, agriculture, tobacco, cotton and small-scale gold mining.
In establishing a maize industry, profits were appropriated to benefit
‘inefficient white farmers.’9 However, the
time for African resistance was fast approaching. [ Back to the top ] After the Second World War, Africans began organizing themselves
in order to challenge the oppressive colonial state. A series of
strikes followed. The most significant ones started at the beginning
of 1945, followed by the major Railway Strike of 1948. The pace
and intensity later spread to embrace other Africans within the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland established at the instigation
of Southern Rhodesian settlers in 1953. Increasing regional civil
disobedience characterised the mid-50s. This soon gave way to the
birth of a series of African political parties under the African
National Congress banner in Nyasaland [now Malawi], Northern Rhodesia
[now Zambia] and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). The basis of these political
parties was in all cases, trade unionism.10 In 1953, Southern Rhodesia achieved a long cherished goal of “amalgamation
or Federation” that had first been championed by the BSA Co.
in 1911. The racially based capitalist ‘super-exploitation’
was extended to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Zimbabwe Peoples
African Union (ZAPU) emerged and was banned before the collapse
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in December 1963. In
May of the same year, the organization split along ethnic lines,
resulting in the formation of the Shona dominated Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU). This resulted in the formation of two ethnically
based parties that were to be in the forefront of fighting for the
liberation of Zimbabwe between 1963-80. From 1964, the process of decolonisation on the African continent
gathered momentum but only in the areas that did not have significant
white settlement. The latter were generally located in the temperate
zones of the continent. In Kenya, Rhodesia and South Africa, the
ruling white regimes declined to share political authority with
the African majority. While South Africa had voluntarily withdrawn
from the increasingly black membership of the Commonwealth in 1961,
the then Rhodesia adopted Unilateral Declaration of Independence
(UDI) in 1965. Eventually the non-compromising stance by white settlers
forced the African to move from civil disobedience to adopt the
armed struggle. In Zimbabwe, the two political parties of ZAPU and
ZANU established military wings whose chief purpose was to confront
the heavily armed colonial state. There were three important historical
epochs in the evolution of the political leadership of this country,
until the 1960s. The first was the occupation in September 1890 by the B.S.A. Co.
This was followed by its handing-over political power to the settler
white community in 1922. Finally, the latter, unilaterally moved
out of the British decolonisation process on the African continent
in the 1960s. As Malawi and Zambia secured their political independence,
Rhodesia rebelled and sought to link its future with apartheid South
Africa. In 1965 the Rhodesian Front was in the driving seat, declaring
UDI in 1967. This set the scene for a bitter and protracted struggle.This
is the point at which Gerald’s work then intervenes. [ Back to the top ] With the white settler community in Rhodesia facing an increasingly
disillusioned and angry African people, the United States pursued
a policy of supporting the beleaguered white regime. As the UN sanctions
began to take effect after 1967, the US continued to assist the
Rhodesian regime through the apartheid regime in South Africa. The US continued to buy chrome from Rhodesia, in violation of UN
sanctions and argued that the mineral was a strategic raw material.
The US also contributed to the establishment of an armaments industry
in Rhodesia. Horne’s work provides a refreshing look at the war from the
perspective of an Afro-American who has genuine concern for Africa
and Zimbabwe in particular. His main contribution is that, the US
policy against Zimbabwe was informed by local developments in the
United States regarding its own racial problems. The US feared that
the Rhodesian situation could impact negatively on the US racial
divide. The second important point motivating the United States to adopt
this stance throughout this period was cold war considerations.
Horne makes the argument that there was collusion between the US
and China. China appears to have been encouraged by the US to offer
assistance on the basis of directly opposing Russia. Amongst the
Zimbabwean nationalists and armed factions, ZAPU and ZIPRA drew
their support from Russia and significantly also from Cuba. Meanwhile,
ZANU established close politico-military relations with China and
Yugoslavia amongst others. The US-China liberation intrigue appears
to have escaped the attention of many researchers. If this is further
substantiated, then Horne needs to be commended. Thirdly, in a development that has so far not been obvious to most, the US provided the technical knowledge and support — through South Africa — toward establishing the 700 kilometre Border Minefield Obstacle along the borders with Zambia and Mozambique.11 While the US has returned to remove the mines, its earlier role has never been fully acknowledged. Under the current programme of demining, the specific contribution to the construction of the obstacle has remained obscure. Furthermore, US servicemen and other mercenaries joined the Rhodesian
Security Forces ranks. Many of them imported military ideas and
concepts from Vietnam where the US had been involved in 1975, to
the battlefield in Rhodesia. Finally, Hornes’ work does suffer from a bias that seeks to address an American audience. This is to be expected given his own background. This makes it heavy going for those Southern Africanist specialists already familiar with the terrain, if we take the long introduction on the basic political history of Southern Africa.12 The first three phases of the Preamble on Power and Policy for instance, takes a rather long-winded lead up to the story to the extent of repeating itself in several places. [ Back to the top ] Conclusion Endnotes
Martin R. Rupiya, Ph.D. Centre for Defence Studies, University of Zimbabwe [ Back to the top ]
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